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Abstract:  
This paper explores the effect of divorce law reforms on fertility. By modifying the 
value of marriage, the introduction of divorce law reforms may impact fertility decisions. To 
identify the effects of those reforms on fertility, we use a quasi-experiment exploiting the 
legislative history of divorce liberalization across Europe. Results suggest that divorce law 
reforms have a negative and permanent effect on fertility. Divorce reforms decreased the Total 
Fertility Rate by about 0.2. The magnitude of the effect is sizable, taking into account that the 
average Total Fertility Rate declined from 2.84 in 1960 to 1.66 in 2006. These findings are 
robust to alternative specifications and controls for observed (such as the liberalization of 
abortion and the availability of the birth-control pill, among others) and unobserved country-
specific factors, and time-varying factors at the country level. Supplemental analysis, developed 
to understand the mechanisms through which divorce law reforms affect fertility, shows that 
both marital and out-of-wedlock fertility decline, but that the impact on marital fertility varies, 
depending on whether couples are married prior to or after divorce law reforms. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past fifty years, European countries have experienced a considerable decrease in the 
fertility rate, from a Total Fertility Rate (TFR), defined as the mean number of children that 
would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing 
years conforming to the fertility rates by age of a given year, of 2.84 on average in 1960, to a 
TFR lower than 1.9 in almost all European countries in 2006, with the lowest TFR being for 
Greece (1.4), Italy (1.34), Spain (1.38), and Portugal (1.36), according to Eurostat. These levels, 
below the replacement rate of 2.1, are an ongoing concern for policy-makers and researchers 
alike. The search for explanations of this decline in fertility (see for a review Feyrer et al. 2008) 
has covered much ground: the dramatic increase in female labour force participation (Ahn and 
Mira 2002; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Engelhardt et al. 2004; Michael 1985), the increase in 
earnings that increased the opportunity cost of women’s time (Becker 1981), the technological 
progress (Galor and Weil 1996; Greenwood and Seshadri 2002), the decline in infant mortality 
(Doepke 2005; Sah 1991), the law reforms that made abortion more accessible, and the 
availability of the birth control pill (Ananat et al. 2007; Goldin and Katz 2000, 2002; Guldi 
2008), among others. In this paper, we present evidence suggesting that divorce law reforms 
have also played an important role. 
We are not the first to study empirically the effect of divorce law reforms on fertility 
but, to our knowledge, there is no existing literature that has examined reform’s impact on 
European fertility rates. The majority of papers have focussed on the effect of public policies 
that regulate the aftermath of divorce in the US. Aizer and McLanahan (2006) studied the effect 
of the enforcement of child support on fertility, and they determined that it affects the birth 
selection process. Halla (2013) showed that the adoption of the joint custody regime positively 
affects fertility in the US. Less work has been done on the analysis of the fertility effects of the 
divorce law reforms that regulate how spouses obtain a divorce. Alesina and Giuliano (2007) 
and Drewianka (2008), both using US data, found that the implementation of divorce law 
reforms has a negative effect on the fertility rate. 
By reducing the value of marriage relative to divorce, the liberalization of divorce laws 
is expected to impact fertility. The decrease in the costs associated with divorce due to legal 
reforms (Brinig and Crafton 1994; Peters 1992), which make out-of-marriage options more 
relevant under the bargaining approach (Brinig and Crafton 1994, McElroy and Horney 1981); 
the weakening of marriage as an insurance under the new divorce law regimes (Grossbard-
Shechtman et al. 2002); and the decline in the benefits derived from marriage due to divorce law 
reforms (Allen 1992), all make marriage less attractive, not only for those who are married, but 
also for those contemplating marriage. This decline in the value of marriage is predicted to 
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negatively affect marital fertility in the extent to which children are considered as marriage-
specific capital (Becker et al. 1977; Stevenson 2007; Weiss and Willis 1985). However, out-of-
wedlock fertility should remain constant or grow, since there are more single people who may 
wish to bear children. Thus, the effect on the whole fertility rate should be negative or non-
significant, if the increase in out-of-wedlock fertility compensates for the decline in marital 
fertility. It is also possible to find other explanations in the economic literature for the impact of 
divorce law reforms on fertility. As the costs of divorce have been reduced with the 
liberalization of divorce laws, the costs of entering into a bad marriage (in which couples are 
more likely to divorce) are also reduced. Then, the decision to marry may be easier to take, 
especially if there are individuals who want to have children in a marital setting (Alesina and 
Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 2008). As a consequence, we would expect a decrease in out-of-
wedlock fertility and an increase in marital fertility. Marital fertility can also rise because 
couples who are already married may utilize investment in marriage-specific capital, 
strategically over-investing in children to increase the value of their marriage, when divorce 
reforms are adopted (Stevenson 2007). On the other hand, if agreements are difficult to sustain 
when divorce is easier to obtain under a new divorce law regime (Stevenson 2007), we would 
expect that couples would not want to procreate until they envision good long-term prospects 
for their relationships. In the same way as those who are married, couples who cohabit can also 
have less incentive to rear children until they are sure that their relationship is lasting, due to the 
increase in outside options (more divorces) generated by divorce liberalization. In this setting, 
we would expect a decline in fertility by delaying births. Thus, given that there are several 
forces operating through marital and non-marital fertility, whether divorce law reforms have an 
impact on fertility decisions appears to be an empirical issue. 
In our analysis, we construct a panel of 18 European countries spanning the period from 
1960 to 2006, using data from Eurostat, to analyze the effect of changes in divorce laws on 
fertility rates.1 We identify the relationship by exploiting the legislative history of divorce 
liberalization across European countries. Our results suggest that the introduction of divorce law 
reforms decreases fertility rates, and that the effect appears to be permanent. These results are 
consistent with the use of different measures of fertility rates - the main measures used are the 
Total Fertility Rate, the Crude Birth Rate, measured as the annual number of births per 100 
inhabitants, and the Completed Fertility Rate, defined as the average number of children born to 
a cohort of women up to the end of their childbearing age, from the cohort´s beginning of 
exposure to risk (at age 15) up to the age when all members of the cohort have reached the end 
of their reproductive period (at age 49) - and with the use of fertility rates by age of the mother. 
                                                 
1 The countries considered in the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. 
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Results show that fertility falls in all age groups, with the decline being greater for women 
between 20 and 34 years old. 
These findings contribute to the growing literature on the impact of changes in divorce 
laws on socio-economic outcomes. Using methodologies very similar to ours, much of the 
recent literature has focused on the impact of divorce law reforms on divorce rates, generally 
finding a positive relationship between the permissiveness of the laws and the probability of 
divorce (Friedberg 1998; González-Val and Marcén 2012b; Gray 1998; Peters 1986, 1992; 
Wolfers 2006, for the US; and González and Viitanen 2009; González-Val and Marcén 2012a, 
for Europe). Other researchers have studied the effect of the change in divorce laws on suicide, 
domestic violence, and spousal homicides (Dee 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006), marriage 
rates (Drewianka 2008; Mechoulan 2006; Rasul 2006), marriage-specific investments 
(Stevenson 2007), labour supply (Gray 1998; Peters 1986), and child outcomes (Gruber 2004; 
Johnson and Mazingo 2000). Not only do we add to this literature by examining the effect of 
divorce law reforms on fertility, but we provide additional evidence implying that our results are 
not driven by unobserved country-specific factors, time-varying factors at the country level, the 
liberalization of abortion, reforms of cohabitation laws, or the availability of the birth-control 
pill. 
We introduce controls for fixed and trending unobserved factors at the country level that 
may be correlated with fertility. In addition, we include in our main specification a host of 
country level variables that appear to be related to fertility rates. For instance, given that fertility 
rates are lower among women who participate in the labour market (Alba et al. 2009; Kalwij 
2000) and among those who are more educated (Bloemen and Kalwij 2001; Breierova and 
Duflo 2004; Leon 2004), the massive incorporation of women to work since the 1970s may be 
driving our results. After including all these controls, the coefficients that capture the effect of 
divorce law reforms change very little. A potential concern with this analysis is that it omits 
reforms that introduced changes in the abortion and cohabitation laws, the introduction of the 
oral contraceptive pill, and other family policies. To examine this issue, we add to our main 
specification controls for legislative variations across countries in the timing of abortion and 
cohabitation reforms, for the introduction of the pill, and for several variables capturing family 
policies. Results are robust to the introduction of all these controls. These findings suggest that 
our analysis is identifying the role of divorce law reforms, as opposed to other reforms affecting 
the ability to control fertility, and also to fixed and time-variant (observed and unobserved) 
factors at the country level. 
In the final section, we examine how divorce law reforms operate by analysing the 
effect on out-of-wedlock fertility and on marital fertility, separately. We find that the marital 
fertility rate decreases as a consequence of the liberalization of divorce laws, but that the effect 
is transitory; after a decade, no effect can be discerned. On the contrary, the impact on out-of-
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wedlock fertility is not clear (coefficients measuring this effect are not significant in all 
specifications) until 7 to 8 years after the adoption of divorce law reforms, when out-of-wedlock 
fertility begins to negatively respond to the new divorce laws. Thus, our results suggest that the 
decrease in the TFR might be driven by two forces: first, after the adoption of reforms, the TFR 
may fall due to the reaction of marital fertility, and after 7 to 8 years it may be driven by the 
reaction of out-of-wedlock fertility. We also explore whether the timing of marital births is 
influenced by divorce law reforms, using data from several issues of the UN Demographic 
Yearbooks. Results suggest that divorce law reforms may have different effects on fertility, 
depending on whether couples were married before, or after, the divorce law reforms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the empirical 
strategy. Section III describes the data. Baseline results and robustness checks are discussed in 
Section IV. In Section V, we analyse the mechanisms through which divorce law reform 
operates, and Section VI sets out our main conclusions. 
II. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical approach makes use of the variations in the timing of divorce law liberalization 
across European countries, to identify the effects of those reforms on fertility rates. The reforms 
consist of any change in divorce laws that liberalizes divorce by expanding the grounds of 
divorce, such as irretrievable breakdown, irreconcilable differences, and/or incompatibility, and 
of those changes that introduce implicitly (at least after a required separation period) or 
explicitly (divorce can be granted at the request of either spouse) unilateral divorce. It is known 
as no-fault unilateral divorce reforms. This is a standard strategy in the economic literature 
analysing the effects of divorce law reforms for the case of the US and Europe (see for example 
Friedberg 1998; González and Viitanen 2009, and Wolfers 2006). But, is it a natural 
experiment? To utilize the legislative history of divorce laws to make inferences about the 
causal effect of divorce reforms, the variation in the timing of liberalization should not mirror 
pre-existing divergences in country-level specific characteristics. In order to evaluate this 
assumption, we use country-level characteristics for each of the 18 countries. Data come from a 
variety of sources (see Appendix). As dependent variable, we use the “time to liberalization”, 
measured as the year in which divorce law reforms were adopted in each country, minus 1970, 
the year in which the first reform in the period analysed was introduced (see for a similar 
strategy Bailey 2006, although she studied the availability of the contraceptive pill). 
Table 1 presents the estimates and robust standard errors from cross-country regressions 
of “time to liberalization” on selected 1960 (Panel A) and 1970 (Panel B) country-level 
attributes. As can be seen, none of the characteristics is statistically significant. Although these 
results should be taken with precaution due to the scarcity of data, the absence of a statistical 
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relationship to those potential determinants of divorce law reforms gives more credibility to our 
empirical strategy, considering divorce reforms as a valid natural experiment. 2 Despite these 
striking findings, we certainly acknowledge that differences in social norms, divorce taboos, 
countries’ judiciary, legislatures, and political regimes, could result in considerable variation in 
the timing of the implementation of the reforms, but the exact year in which divorce law 
reforms were adopted appears to be exogenous. As in prior works, and given the results reported 
in Table 1, we favour the use of the legislative history of divorce law reforms to capture the 
effects of those legal changes on fertility. 
Initially, our estimation strategy follows the methodology proposed by Friedberg (1998) 
to capture the effect of divorce law reforms. We estimate the following expression: 
 
Fertiltiy rates,t = βReforms,t + Σs Country fixed Effectss + Σt Time fixed Effectst + 
 [Σs Countrys*Timet + Σs Countrys*Time2t] + εs,t                 (1) 
 
where Reforms,t is a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” when country s has a no-fault 
unilateral divorce law regime in year t, and “0” otherwise. The parameter β is interpreted as the 
average change in the total fertility rate that can be assigned to the change in the legal system of 
divorce. From a theoretical point of view, as mentioned above, the sign of this parameter is not 
clear, since these new divorce regimes can have positive and negative effects on fertility. 
Equation (1) also includes country fixed effects and year fixed effects to control for evolving 
unobserved country attributes, and linear and quadratic trends, which allow us to capture trends 
in country-level unobserved factors affecting fertility. Regressions are estimated by population-
weighted least squares. 3 
This methodology only identifies a discrete series break (static model). However, it is 
conceivable that the impact of divorce law liberalization has very different short-run and long-
run effects, which may induce a gradual change in fertility rates. To tackle this issue, we also 
estimate the dynamic response of fertility rates to divorce law reforms (dynamic model) as in 
Wolfers (2006): 
 
Fertility rates,t = Σk  βkReforms,t,k + Σs Country fixed Effectss + Σt Time fixed Effectst + 
 [Σs Countrys*Timet + Σs Countrys*Time2t] + εs,t            (2) 
                                                 
2  We also repeat the analysis by including data from 1960 to 1969 and results suggest that some of these variables 
are correlated with the differences in the time to liberalization. However, they fail to predict the exact year in which 
divorce law reforms took place, again suggesting that the exact date of divorce law reforms can be considered 
exogenous. 
3  We also repeat the analysis by introducing clusters at the country level. Results do not substantially change. 
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with the variable Reforms,t,k being a dummy set equal to “1” when country s has implemented a 
no-fault unilateral divorce law regime in year t for k periods, and “0” otherwise. These dummy 
variables are supposed to capture the entire dynamic response of fertility to the new legal 
regime, while the country-specific time trends identify pre-existing trends. A negative sign of 
the β parameter indicates that the fertility rate in country s has fallen after k periods since the 
change in divorce law. The interpretation of a positive sign would be just the opposite. 
III. Data 
For the main analysis, we use the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for the period 1960 - 2006. 4 The 
data for the fertility rate are publicly available from Eurostat. TFR is defined there as “the mean 
number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass 
through her childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by age of a given year. It is 
therefore the completed fertility of a hypothetical generation, computed by adding the fertility 
rates by age for women in a given year (the number of women at each age is assumed to be the 
same).” 
Figure 1 shows the temporal evolution of the Total Fertility Rate in Europe. From 1960 
to 1964, the average Total Fertility Rate slightly increases, reaching a level of 2.88. 
Subsequently, there is a clearly observed decline in the average Total Fertility Rate until 1994, 
with this average rate being lower than the replacement level since 1975. That was followed by 
a period of relative stability, around an average rate of 1.60. This stable rate was interrupted by 
an acceleration since 2003 that continues until the end of our sample in 2006. Additionally, we 
have plotted the evolution of the TFR in the years prior to and after the divorce law reform of 
each country, and introducing the average TFR of the remaining countries that have not changed 
their divorce laws before or during the period considered (see similar figures in Ayres and 
Levitt 1998). We show as an example the cases of Portugal and the Netherlands (see Figures 2 
and 3). We observe that, as expected, there is a greater decrease in the TFR of the country that 
experienced the divorce law reform than in that of those countries that do not change their 
divorce laws during the period. This behaviour is not limited to the TFR. Other measures 
represented in Figure 4, such as the Crude Birth Rate (measured as the annual number of births 
per 100 inhabitants) and the Birth Rate (annual number of births per 100 women) for Europe, 
have a similar pattern to that of the average Total Fertility Rate. 
                                                 
4 To fill in the gaps, we use data from several issues of the UN Demographic Yearbooks, and the available data 
points, plus a linear, a quadratic trend, and mid-points. We also run regressions with the unbalanced and shorter 
versions (considering fewer years in the sample and dropping each country in turn) of the panel. Results are quite 
robust to all these samples. 
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This quick glance at fertility rates does not appear to reveal the presence of a causal link 
between the reforms of divorce laws and those rates. However, given that the drop in the Total 
Fertility Rate continued while European countries introduced their reforms, it is possible to 
argue that those reforms impacted the Total Fertility Rate. The timing of the main reforms in 
no-fault and unilateral divorce laws is summarized by Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009). The 
period of reforms began in 1970, when Denmark implemented a divorce law reform that 
allowed unilateral divorce after a period of separation. After 1970, four European countries 
allowed divorce (Italy (1971), Portugal (1976), Spain (1981) and Ireland (1997)); two passed 
only no-fault divorce (Ireland and Italy); eleven permitted divorce when a couple had lived apart 
for a specified period of time, allowing unilateral divorce after separation in the 1970s and 
1980s (Austria (1978), Belgium (1975), France (1976), Germany (1977), Greece (1979) 
Luxembourg (1979), The Netherlands (1971) and the UK (1971)); two allowed this regime in 
1993 (Iceland and Norway), and another in 2000 (Switzerland). Only two countries (Finland 
(1988) and Sweden (1974)) recognized unilateral divorce, the right to divorce at the request of 
either spouse. In our empirical analysis, we categorize all these legal changes as no-fault 
unilateral divorce because all reduce the value of marriage, regardless of the regime (as 
described previously), and because the empirical literature does not distinguish between these 
types of reform, as in the case of US divorce law reforms. This strategy can make our results 
comparable with prior works. 5 In the following sections, we provide evidence of the effect of 
those divorce law reforms on fertility rates. 
IV. Results 
A. Baseline Regression 
 
Table 2 reports the estimates for Equation (1). As can be seen in the first column, which 
includes country and year fixed effects, a change in divorce law is associated with a decline in 
the fertility rate. This is maintained even after adding country-specific linear and quadratic time 
trends in Columns (3) and (5), although the estimated coefficient on the divorce law reform 
increases (decreases in absolute value) by around 14% after including those controls in the 
specifications. This is presumably because, in these specifications, not only are we removing 
country fixed characteristics but also time-variant unobservable factors that could bias the 
results presented in Column (1). 
To examine the impact of the liberalization of divorce laws, we also use an alternative 
strategy proposed by Wolfers (2006), which allows us to analyse the dynamic response of the 
                                                 
5 As a robustness check, we re-run the baseline analysis by including a dummy variable that controls for those 
countries introducing divorce for the first time during the period considered. Results for our variables of interest do 
not vary. 
9 
 
fertility rate to the implementation of divorce law reforms. Table 2 also shows regressions for 
Equation (2) in Columns (2), (4) and (6). In all these specifications, the dynamic estimates show 
a negative response of fertility following the adoption of no-fault unilateral divorce, and that 
this effect does not fade over subsequent years. As in the previous case, the magnitude of the 
impact of divorce law reforms decreases in absolute value when quadratic trends are added. All 
in all, results suggest that divorce reforms that occurred in Europe contributed to the decline in 
fertility, and that the impact was not transitory. 
We also provide evidence to demonstrate that our results are not driven by omitted 
economic and demographic variables. The impact of these variables correlated with the outcome 
of interest, if omitted, would be captured by the coefficients measuring the effect of divorce law 
reforms. We add controls to our baseline regression for several standard determinants of TFR 
that could explain the drop in our outcome of interest (see Tables 3 and 4).  
The first variable considered is Female Labour Force Participation, with data from the 
OECD (see Appendix). The relationship between Female Labour Force Participation and the 
Total Fertility Rate has been extensively analyzed in the economic literature, establishing a 
negative relationship between both (Mishra and Smyth 2010; Smith-Lovin and Tickamyer 
1978). Then, it is arguable that the increase in Female Labour Force Participation that occured 
since the mid-1960s (see Figure 5) could cause the decline in the Total Fertility Rate, although 
other papers suggest that it was the drop in the Total Fertility Rate that instigated the rise in 
Female Labour Force Participation (Bloom et al. 2009; Mishra et al. 2010). Despite the 
endogeneity concerns that the introduction of this variable may generate, its inclusion in 
Column (2) of Table 3 does not change the estimated coefficients of the impact of divorce law 
reforms. The striking feature is that the coefficient picking up the Female Labour Force 
Participation effect is not significant. This could be due to the fact that this coefficient may not 
be fully capturing the relationship between both variables. Ahn and Mira (2002) suggested that 
the relationship between Female Labour Force Participation and the Fertility Rate is not linear 
but has a U-shape. Until the early 1980s, a negative relationship is observed between both 
variables, but since the late-1980s, the relationship between them turns out to be positive. 6 To 
examine this issue, we have also included a quadratic term for Female Labour Force 
Participation in Column (2) of Table 4. In this case, the coefficients picking up the effect of 
Female Labour Force Participation on the Total Fertility Rate are significant, pointing to a 
quadratic relationship between them. With respect to the effect of divorce reforms, results do 
not change; the coefficients are still negative and significant. 
                                                 
6 Other papers, such as Kogel (2004), do not find a positive correlation between fertility and female employment. 
They simply present evidence of a reduction in the negative association between them since the mid-1980s, (see 
Engelhardt et al. 2004, for a review of this literature).  
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The fall in the Total Fertility Rate can also be attributed to the rise of female schooling 
in the European countries considered (Leon 2004). Female education can lower fertility by way 
of an increase in the opportunity cost of women’s time (Barro and Becker 1988; Willis 1973), or 
by increasing the age at marriage (Breierova and Duflo 2004), which can delay births and so 
lower the level of completed fertility (Kalwij 2000). To capture the impact of female education, 
we introduce the Female Gross Enrolment Ratio constructed by UNESCO (see Appendix) in 
Column (3) of Table 3. Results on the effect of divorce law reforms do not change, even after 
the inclusion of a quadratic term for female education in Column (3) of Table 4.7 The quadratic 
term for the female education proxy is also significant, but negative, pointing to an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the Female Gross Enrolment Ratio and the Total Fertility Rate. 
The decline in the infant mortality rate could also contribute to the decline of the Total 
Fertility Rate. The lower the infant mortality, the fewer children need to be replaced. On the 
other hand, falling mortality rates lower the cost of having a surviving child, and for this reason 
fertility should increase as mortality declines (Doepke 2005; Sah 1991). To control for this 
determinant of fertility, we incorporate in the analysis the ratio of the number of deaths of 
children under 1 year old during the year, to the number of live births in that year, using data 
from Eurostat. After adding this variable, the dynamic response of the Total Fertility Rate to the 
introduction of the new divorce regimes is quite similar (Column (4) in Tables 3, linear 
relationship, and 4, quadratic relationship). 
The per capita GDP has also been included as a control in Column (5) of Table 3 and 
Table 4 (with a quadratic term), since several studies have found that fertility has fallen in 
economic expansions and risen during contractions (Butz and Ward 1979; Hazan and Berdugo 
2002).8 Results are unchanged to the introduction of per capita GDP. Unstable employment and 
unemployment might also influence the variation in the Total Fertility Rate by increasing 
uncertainty about future wages, which may encourage women to postpone (or even abandon) 
childbearing (Adserà 2004; Ahn and Mira 2001; Gutierrez-Domenech 2007; Doiron and 
Mendolia 2011). 9 Column (8) of Table 3 and Column (7) of Table 4 (adding the quadratic term) 
show the estimated effect of the unemployment rate on the Total Fertility Rate, with the 
expected negative sign. Our coefficients of interest are not sensitive - they are still negative and 
statistically significant - to its inclusion in the model. 10 
                                                 
7 Results are also quite robust to the use of other measures of female education provided by UNESCO, which allow 
us to consider separately the Gross Enrolment Ratio by level of education (secondary and tertiary) and the 
introduction of the Total Gross Enrolment Ratio (male and female education). 
8 The per capita GDP can also be considered as a proxy of the increase in female and male earnings, which are also 
expected to affect fertility decisions (Galor and Weil 1996; Macunovich 1995; Ward and Butz 1980). 
9 Although we have not included a control for male employment, which is another potential determinant of fertility 
(Ahn and Mira 2001), the introduction of the unemployment rate may be partly capturing the importance of both 
female and male employment. 
10 The youth unemployment rate and the great number of temporary contracts may also have an important effect on 
the drop in the fertility rate by increasing uncertainty regarding future careers and earnings, as well as by lowering 
current income for young men and women. But, because of the scarcity of the data, which are only available since the 
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Other public policies, such as tax exemptions, maternity leave, and parental benefits, 
can account for a sizable fraction of the fluctuation in the Total Fertility Rate (see, for example, 
Acs 1996; Averett and Whittington 2001; Demeny 1986; Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999; 
Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Georgellis and Wall 1992; Kearney 2004; Lalive and Zweimüller 
2009; Manuelli and Seshadri 2009; Milligan 2005; Whittington 1992; Whittington et al. 1990; 
Zhang et al. 1994). This is relevant to our analysis, since improvements in family policies may 
raise the level of fertility (Björklund 2006), compensating for the impact of divorce law 
reforms. Thus, we include a wide range of controls for family policies in columns (12) to (21) of 
Table 3, including the total number of weeks of maternity, parental, and childcare leave; the 
cash benefits during them;, the monthly family allowances for the first, second and third child; 
the value of transfers to a family type; and an index of direct and indirect cash benefits 
(variables properly defined in Appendix). We observe that, regardless of the measure of family 
policy included in our estimates, and even including all of them in the same specification, the 
negative and statistically significant effect of divorce law reforms on fertility is maintained. In 
addition, and recognizing the importance of these family policies as fertility determinants, we 
include two different proxies for the effect of public policies. First, we use per capita GDP, 
since the greater the GDP, the more family policies may be implemented. As shown before, this 
does not affect our estimates. Another possibility is the use of data on women in parliament, 
since female legislators are more likely to place priority on women’s, children’s and family 
issues (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Swers 2002). We then introduce the percentage of 
women in each national parliament on the total of seats in the parliament, as a proxy of the 
variation in public policies, using data from the Inter- Parliamentary Union, in Columns (6) and 
(7) (adding the per capita GDP) of Table 3 and in Column (6) of Table 4 (with the quadratic 
term). Our results are robust to the inclusion of all these controls. 
The marriage rate is another variable added as control to our main specification, since it 
is considered to be one of the principal determinants of fertility (Bongaarts 1978). The lower the 
marriage rate, the lower the marital fertility. Since children are a marital-specific investment 
(Becker et al. 1977; Stevenson 2007), we would expect that the decline in the marriage rate, 
which can be seen in Figure 5, leads to a drop in the Total Fertility Rate. Following this 
argument, we can justify the introduction of the divorce rate, since the greater the divorce rate, 
the lower the marital fertility. Again, our results do not vary substantially, even after adding 
quadratic terms for all these regressors (see Tables 3 and 4). Similarly, changes in cohabitation 
decisions can also affect the fertility decisions of women. To examine this issue, we incorporate 
in our analysis changes in cohabitation laws that were approved during recent decades in several 
                                                                                                                                               
1980s, we cannot add these as regressors. We have a similar problem with the fluctuations of the price of housing. 
We would expect that these effects can be captured by the controls for fixed and trending unobserved factors at the 
country level, incorporated in the analysis. 
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European countries in order to increase protections for cohabiting couples (see column (4) of 
Table 5). The introduction of these laws took place several years (in certain cases, decades) after 
the introduction of divorce law reforms. Then, the permanent impact of divorce law reforms on 
fertility observed in our baseline estimates may be capturing the effect of both cohabitation laws 
and divorce law reform. Results are presented in Table 6. Our findings do not change, even after 
the introduction of controls for the cohabitation laws. 
To check whether our results are sensitive to the measure of fertility used in the 
previous analysis, we run several simple robustness checks. We use four additional common 
measures of fertility as dependent variables: the Crude Birth Rate, defined as the annual number 
of births per 100 inhabitants, the Birth Rate, measured as the annual number of births per 100 
women, the Log(TFR), which is the Total Fertility Rate in logarithm, and the Completed 
Fertility Rate, which is the average number of children born to a cohort of women up to the end 
of their childbearing age, from the cohort´s beginning of exposure to risk (at age 15) until the 
age when all members of the cohort have reached the end of the reproductive period (at age 
49).11 Results for the first three dependent variables are presented in Figure 6, which shows that, 
though the magnitude of the impact varies a little, the behaviour of the impact is quite similar. 
The growing negative impact of the reforms stabilizes after 7-8 years of the adoption of no-fault 
unilateral divorce laws, and 13-14 years after the reforms, the negative and significant effect is 
smoothed. Meanwhile, in order to use the Completed Fertility Rate as dependent variable, we 
must re-define our variables of interest, which in this case are defined as the number of years 
that each cohort of women lives under the new divorce laws. Data on the Completed Fertility 
Rate was obtained from two different sources - from the Council of Europe (1940 to 1944 and 
1961 to 1970), and computed by us using data from Eurostat and from the UN Demographic 
Yearbooks (several issues) for years 1945 to 1960. Then, we have the completed fertility rate of 
those women who were born from 1945 to 1970-. As expected, results show that the cohorts of 
women who spend more years under the new divorce laws experience greater declines in their 
completed fertility rate (see Table 7). This result is in the same vein as previous results using as 
dependent variable the Total Fertility Rate. It is not surprising, since certain papers have pointed 
to the close relationship between the Total Fertility Rate and the Completed Fertility Rate 
(Bongaarts 2002).  
Finally, we have also used as a dependent variable the fertility rate by age of women, to 
test whether we are capturing the behaviour of a specific group of women (DeCooman et al. 
1987). As an increase in women’s education may decrease the fertility rate of younger women, 
one can argue that we are capturing the decrease in the Total Fertility Rate of those women who 
spend more years in education, rather than the entire response to divorce law reforms. Figure 7 
                                                 
11 Since women are mainly the ones who decide to have children or not, we also use the Birth Rate, whose 
denominator is the total number of women. 
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presents the response of the TFR for women aged 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 
39, and 40 to 44. All coefficients are negative, indicating that the Total Fertility Rate decreases 
as a consequence of the implementation of the new divorce law regimes, irrespective of the age 
of the women. However, there are slight differences; the greater impact is observed for those 
women aged 25 to 29, suggesting that women delayed their births, or that they do not have 
children at all.  
B. Is it divorce law, or is it the liberalization of abortion laws? 
While reforms in laws of divorce were introduced throughout Europe, all but one country 
(Ireland) established new abortion laws that overturned previous legislation. Eight of the 
eighteen countries permitted only abortion for cause since the mid-1960s, see Table 5. Under 
this regime, reasons for allowing abortion include: rape, incest, severe foetal abnormality, and 
physical and mental health problems of the mother. Five countries adopted abortion on demand, 
that is, without restrictions, although gestation limits (i.e. first trimester, or until viability) were 
established in most countries. The remaining four countries passed both regimes during the 
period analysed. Abortion laws were classified using Brooks (1992), Henshow and Morrow 
(1990), and information from the United Nations Population Division (2003). 
These reforms decreased the cost of abortion, which of course could have an effect on 
fertility (Ananat et al. 2007; Guldi 2008; Levine et al. 1999). Women can now abort 
pregnancies that would have resulted in unwanted births. Another concern is that the effect of 
abortion reforms may be confounded with the impact of divorce law reforms. To tackle this 
issue, as in previous works on the impact of abortion laws on several socio-economic variables, 
we use a quasi-experiment exploiting the variation in the timing of abortion reforms to capture 
the effect of these abortion reforms on the Total Fertility Rate (see, for example, Ananat et al. 
2007; Donohue and Levitt 2001; Guldi 2008). We introduce as explanatory variables dummies 
to control for the years since abortion laws by grounds (on demand or by cause) were adopted. 12 
Results are shown in Table 8. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the estimates of the main 
specification, and Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the response of the Total Fertility Rate to the 
divorce law reforms, after adding controls for abortion law reforms. As can be seen, results are 
quite similar. Then, even adding controls for abortion, we find that divorce law reforms 
negatively impacts the Total Fertility Rate. With respect to the impact of abortion law reforms, 
the effect is not clear, although when country-specific linear trends are added, all the 
                                                 
12 We have not incorporated in our analysis other methods that offer women a safe and quite effective alternative to 
the surgical abortion, such as mifepristone or RU-486, licensed in most European countries since the late 1980s, 
inasmuch as, despite the widespread introduction of this drug, women’s access to and the use of this technology 
remains limited by the abortion legislation (see Entre Nous 2005). 
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coefficients are negative and significant, pointing to a decrease of the Total Fertility Rate as a 
consequence of the introduction of the new abortion laws. 13 
C. Is it divorce law, or is it the Pill? 
Another important feature that began in the 1960s was the emergence of the oral contraceptive, 
better known as The Pill. It gave women the opportunity to safely decide when to have children 
and allowed the separation between sexual activity and procreation (Goldin and Katz 2000, 
2002). This is important in our analysis, since one may surmise that it was the use of the pill that 
caused the drop in the number of births in Europe. Although, for the case of European countries, 
the literature is quite limited, several papers have pointed to the access to the Pill as an 
important determinant of the decline in post-1960 US fertility (Bailey 2006, 2009, 2010; Guldi 
2008). 14 The power of the Pill is gaining attention among researchers, not only for the analysis 
of its impact on fertility, but also on other socio-economic outcomes - always using US data - 
such as female labour force participation (Goldin and Katz 2000, 2002), female education 
(Ananat and Hungerman 2012; Hock 2007), marriage (Edlund and Machado 2011), and even 
children’s outcomes (Ananat and Hungerman 2012; Pantano 2007). 
In the case of Europe, as can be seen in Figure 8, when the population with access to the 
Pill reached almost 50%, the Crude Birth Rate began to decrease. Note that, in Figure 8, we use 
information on the year in which the pill was first authorised but, in some countries (such as 
Spain and Ireland), it was not prescribed as a contraceptive until the late 1970s; its use was 
restricted to regulation of the menses.15 Thus, it is possible that those restrictions delayed the 
decline in the Total Fertility Rate, if the Pill was the main determinant of this fertility behaviour. 
The information on the year in which the Pill was available was compiled by the authors from 
each National Agency for the Regulation of Medicines, and from the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) (see Table 5). To our knowledge, there is no prior research using 
this kind of information for all the European countries considered in this analysis. 
To capture the effect of the Pill, we use a similar quasi-experiment to that utilized for 
the case of divorce law reforms, and for the abortion laws. This natural experiment is also a 
common strategy in the Pill literature (see, for example, Bailey 2006, 2009, 2010; Guldi 
2008).16 In our work, we add to the main specification dummies to control for the years since 
the Pill is accessible. Table 9 reports the results. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the baseline 
estimates of Equation (2), and Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the dynamic response of the Total 
                                                 
13 Note that we do not aim to study the effect of abortion law reforms on fertility (see Ananat et al. 2007, for an 
extensive analysis using US data). 
14 See Carro and Mira (2006) for an analysis of the Spanish case. 
15 We have also run the analysis using the information on the year in which the Pill was allowed as a contraceptive. 
Results are quite similar.  
16 An alternative strategy could be the use of data on the use or sales of the Pill, but this is not possible since this 
information is quite scarce. 
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Fertility Rate to divorce law reforms, after controlling for access to the Pill. Once again, our 
results on the Total Fertility Rate’s reaction to divorce law reforms are not being much affected. 
More surprising are the differences in the short- and long-run effects of the Pill; it appears not to 
have decreased the Total Fertility Rate until 13 years after it was introduced. 
Finally, Table 10 presents the results of the main specification in Columns (1), (3) and 
(5), and the estimates after adding all controls that are available for the 18 countries in our 
analysis in Columns (2), (4) and (6).17 Although the magnitude of the negative effect diminishes 
after adding all controls, we still find that divorce law reforms had a negative and significant 
effect on the Total Fertility Rate, and that this effect is lasting. After this analysis, we are 
confident that we are capturing the effect of divorce law reforms, rather than other observed or 
unobserved factors, or other reforms that directly affect family planning.18 Our estimates 
suggest that the introduction of the new divorce law regimes decreased the Total Fertility Rate 
by about 0.1 to 0.2. The magnitude of the effect is sizable, taking into account that the average 
Total Fertility Rate declined from 2.84 in 1960 to 1.66 in 2006.  
 
V. How do divorce laws operate through 
marital and non-marital fertility? 
A. Fertility by marital status 
 
Up to this point, we have empirically studied the impact of divorce law reforms on the Total 
Fertility Rate. In this section, we explore the mechanisms through which these reforms affect 
fertility. To address this issue, we would have liked to have information on what motivates 
fertility decisions, but this information is not available for all countries analysed, in the period 
covered. Instead, we examine whether fertility’s response to divorce law reforms differs 
depending on the marital status of individuals. This is also an interesting issue since, as 
explained above, it has been suggested that these legal reforms affect marital and non-marital 
fertility in different ways. 
Results on the marital fertility rate are shown in Table 11. There, the dependent variable 
is defined as the number of births within marriage per 500 inhabitants (see Appendix).19 The 
dynamic estimates show that the negative effect on marital fertility rates, following the adoption 
                                                 
17 Data on family policies are not available for Iceland. We re-estimate this regression including also data for family 
policies available from 1960 to 2006, and results are quite similar.  
18 Of course, these estimates should be treated with a certain caution, since we have included some variables that may 
generate endogeneity concerns. 
19 We also re-ran the analysis using as dependent variable the number of births within marriage over the number of 
women, and over the number of women aged 15-49. Results are quite similar. 
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of no-fault unilateral divorce, dissipates over the subsequent decade. Coefficients become non-
significant, although negative, so the effect of divorce law reforms on the marital fertility rate 
appears to be transitory. These findings are consistent with certain theoretical predictions 
proposed in the economic literature. The decrease in the value of marriage because of the fall in 
divorce costs (Brinig and Crafton 1994; Peters 1992), in addition to the rise in the couple’s 
instability, as expected, seem to drive the behaviour of the marital fertility rate at least until 10 
years after the legal shift in divorce laws. However, thenceforth, no effect is observed. This 
could be due to an increase in the number of marriages, since the decision to marry can be less 
difficult to take under the new divorce law regimes (Alesina and Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 
2008). It could also be due to an increase in the number of couples already married who decide 
to have children to compensate for the decrease in the value placed on the marriage institution 
(Stevenson 2007), although we admit that this change in the behaviour of married couples 
seems at odds, given that it has been found that children have a negative effect on the duration 
of relationships (Svarer and Verner 2008). 
Another possibility is that the reaction in marital fertility is driven by the decisions of 
those who married after the reform. As time went by, the number of couples who married before 
the reform grew older, and so they were less likely to have children, but the number of 
marriages that took place after the adoption of the new divorce law regime increased. Since, as 
documented by Weiss and Willis (1997), the divorce law regime at the time of marriage is 
relevant in determining the likelihood of divorce, if a great number of couples who married 
under the new divorce law regime are those who were able to sort themselves better at marriage, 
in order to enhance the stability of their marriages and increase the quality of the match, then the 
divorce rate for them should fall (Matouschek and Rasul 2008; Mechoulan 2006; Weiss and 
Willis 1997). This is considered in the literature as the selection effect. As a consequence of 
that, we would expect the marital fertility rate to remain constant or even increase as the number 
of couples married under the new law grows. This potential explanation can shed light on the 
somewhat puzzling change in the response of marital fertility over time. A more detailed 
analysis of marital fertility by duration of marriage (see the following subsection) helps us to 
confirm this prediction. 
The effect on the non-marital fertility rate, calculated as non-marital births per 500 
inhabitants (see Appendix) is not so clear immediately after the reform, but 3-4 years later the 
effect is negative and significant. 20 Results are reported in Table 12. When using the 
illegitimacy ratio, defined as the number of non-marital births per 10 births, the negative and 
statistically significant impact of divorce law reforms on the illegitimacy ratio is not observed 
                                                 
20 As in the case of the marital birth rate, we have also run this analysis changing the denominator of the dependent 
variable to the total number of women and the number of women aged 15-49. Results do not vary. 
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until 7-8 years after the adoption of the new regimes (see Table 13). 21 Our findings are in line 
with those of Drewianka (2008), who suggested that unilateral divorce law increases the 
legitimacy ratio. As proposed in the theoretical literature, the decrease in the costs of divorce 
can make entering marriage easier, even for those who are more likely to enter into a low 
quality match (Alesina and Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 2008). This could explain the reduction 
in the non-marital birth rate. Additionally, since divorce law reforms increased the number of 
outside options, not only for those who are married, but also for those who cohabit (there are 
more divorced people to enter into a new relationship), individuals would be less likely to bear a 
child until they envision a stable relationship. 
 Our findings suggest that the negative effect on the Total Fertility Rate, which 
encompasses both in- and out-of-wedlock fertility, after the adoption of the new divorce 
regimes, appears to be driven by the reaction of the marital fertility rate. But, 7-8 years later, the 
reduction in the Total Fertility Rate is maintained by the decrease in the non-marital fertility 
rate. 
B. Fertility by duration of marriage 
 
For further evidence on the mechanisms through which divorce law reforms operate, we also 
examine its impact on marital fertility, considering marriages of the same duration. As described 
in Lillard (1993), the probability of pregnancy in a marital setting rises during the first five 
years of marriage, and declines thereafter, but if divorce law reforms increase the probability of 
marital dissolution over the marriage duration, this pattern can change. Since divorce costs are 
reduced with the liberalization of divorce laws, the decision to marry immediately after 
becoming pregnant can be easier, since a bad marriage can more easily be dissolved (Alesina 
and Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 2008), and it would be reasonable to expect an increase in the 
fertility of those married for less than a year. However, the considerable increase in the 
likelihood of marital dissolution over the first year of marriage (Lillard 1993), due to the new 
divorce regimes, can reduce the number of conceptions. Thus, the impact of divorce law 
reforms on marital fertility during the first year of marriage seems to be an empirical question. 
 As long as the marriage continues, the probability of dissolution tends to decline, 
because those couples who survive are more experienced in dealing with potential breakdowns 
(Becker et al. 1977). For instance, they may be capable of behaving strategically by over-
investing in children, a marital-specific investment (Stevenson 2007), bringing about an 
increase in marital fertility after the changes in the divorce law, to increase the value of their 
marriages and make them more difficult to break. It is not clear whether this impact can be 
                                                 
21 Results are also consistent with the inclusion of all controls. 
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permanent though, the longer the duration of the marriage, the greater the hazard of another 
pregnancy (Lillard 1993), and the probability of over-investing in children is higher. 
Nevertheless, women, who have traditionally been responsible for the child after divorce, can 
also be less motivated to have another child if they feel more fearful of being deserted, which 
becomes easier under new divorce law regimes. This negative response is expected to be more 
pronounced after 9-10 years of marriage, which is the average duration of marriages prior to 
divorce (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). Then, again, the response of marital fertility as the 
duration of marriage increases is ambiguous. 
 To explore this issue empirically, we use data from 1960 to 1998 on the number of 
births by total duration of married life. This dataset is available in several special issues of the 
UN Demographic Yearbooks.22 The marital duration is defined as the number of completed 
years elapsed between the exact dates of marriage of the wife and the exact date of birth of the 
child. We recognise that this can bias our results, since it is not limited to first marriages, and 
the decision to become pregnant can differ if the wife has been married more than once. 
Another problem with this dataset is that the duration of marriage is not calculated simply by 
difference of years. This implies that the coefficients measuring the fertility response of couples 
of marital duration r to a divorce law reform k years after its adoption in year t are capturing the 
reaction of those who gave birth in year t, and the response of those who had a child in year t+1 
only if the time that elapsed between the exact date of marriage of the wife and the exact date of 
birth of the child is greater than r years but lower than r+1.23  
 Results on the dynamic response of fertility by duration of marriage are displayed in 
Table 14.24 In all those regressions, the dependent variable is defined as the number of 
legitimate births of couples of marital duration r, over the total number of legitimate births. 25 
We show results for 8 (under 1 year of duration, each two years since then until 9 years married, 
and the intervals 10-14, 15-19, 20 and over) of the 14 available categories in the UN 
Demographic Yearbooks. 26 Column (1) presents our estimates for the response of fertility to 
divorce law reforms, for those who have been married for less than 1 year. It is observed that the 
marital fertility rate decreases as a result of divorce law reforms 5-6 years after adoption. The 
effect is not significant immediately after the implementation of divorce law reforms. These 
                                                 
22 Since 1998, this information has been removed from the minimum list of recommended tables and no data is 
shown in the UN Demographic Yearbooks. For robustness, we have also checked all our results by using data until 
1998 and results are unchanged. 
23 For instance, the UN classifies in the category “births after 2 years of marriage” the child of a couple who was born 
in October 1973 and the parents were married in December 1970, rather than placing the child in the category “births 
after 3 years of marriage”. 
24 Results are also quite similar after adding all controls, but because of endogeneity concerns we prefer the estimates 
without controls. 
25 We have also run this analysis using other denominators, such as the total number of births, the total population, 
the total number of women, and the number of women aged 15-49. Differences with the results shown here are not 
discernible. 
26 Results are quite similar in those categories not included in the paper (2 years married, 4 years married, 6 years 
married, and 8 years married). We excluded the category with duration of marriage “unknown”. 
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findings suggest that the so-called “shot-gun” marriages are not driving the behaviour of the 
marital fertility of those married for less than 1 year. Rather, the unstable situation of couples 
during this first year of marriage, which increases after divorce law reforms (as time passes, the 
number of outside options also rises), is more likely to be the cause of the reduction in this 
marital fertility rate. 
 Column (2) shows results on the legitimate fertility of couples who have been married 
for 3 years. The dynamic response seems to be the same. All but one of our estimates are 
positive and statistically significant, pointing to an increase in the marital fertility rate of those 
married for 3 years, as a result of changes in divorce laws. This may indicate that couples decide 
to invest in children to compensate for the decrease in the value placed on the marriage after the 
reforms. One can also surmise that this response of the marital fertility rate is due to the fact that 
couples surviving three years of marriage are in a stable relationship, with a long-term 
perspective, and so they can feel more confident having a child. Although these explanations 
appear to be valid, since their predictions coincide with the results obtained, they have little to 
do with the changes in the behaviour observed when the marital duration increases. 
 Focusing on the dynamic effects of divorce law reforms on fertility, Columns (3), (4) 
and (5) of Table 14 - which report the response of those married for 5, 7, and 9 years, 
respectively  we can clearly observe two distinct patterns in the reaction of those couples. After 
the adoption of the new divorce regimes, the effect is not significant, or negative and 
statistically significant, and some years later the impact becomes positive and significant. Note 
that this startling change in the behaviour of couples does not occur in the same period: the 
greater the duration of the marriage, the less the number of positive and significant coefficients 
found. Then, it is hard to find a unique explanation for this puzzling response, unless we 
consider that marriages that took place before and after divorce law reforms behave in different 
ways.  
As explained above, since divorce law reforms also has a selection effect on the 
composition of marriages, those who were married under the new regimes are less likely to 
divorce (Matouschek and Rasul 2008; Mechoulan 2006), changing their incentive to have 
children. By using data on total marital fertility, this hypothesis was hard to test, but we can 
probe this further by using the dataset on births by duration of marriage, since it allows us to 
observe separately the responses of couples married under different regimes. For instance, the 
sample of marriages of 5 years duration contains both kinds of couple (couples married under 
the old regime and under the reformed divorce law), but our estimates of the dynamic effect do 
not consider the response of those couples together. For instance, the coefficient measuring the 
response of the marital fertility rate of those married 5 years ago, after 1-2 years of the adoption 
of the reform, is unable to capture the behaviour of those married under the new regime; the 
reaction of those who were married the same year as the changes in the law is picked up by the 
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coefficient measuring the impact of the divorce law reforms 5-6 years after adoption. The 
response of couples who married two years after the reform is captured by the coefficient 
measuring the effect of divorce law reforms 7-8 years after adoption, and so on.  
Then, if the changing response is due to the selection effect, we would expect to observe 
a variation in the coefficients picking up the response of couples married under the new regime. 
Results presented in Columns (3) to (5) of Table 14 seem to confirm this forecast: the estimates 
that capture the reaction of the marriages that took place under the new divorce laws are always 
positive and significant, but the coefficients measuring the response of those married under the 
old regime are not significant, or negative and significant. It is important to note that, in some of 
our estimates, the response changes one year earlier than we would expect. In column (3) -those 
married for five years-, we would expect that the first positive and significant coefficient would 
be the estimate measuring the effect of divorce law reforms 5-6 years after adoption, since it is 
supposed to be capturing the behaviour of those married in the same year as the implementation 
of the divorce law reforms. However, we see that the coefficient picking up the impact of the 
reforms 3-4 years after implementation is also positive and significant. One can argue that this 
contradicts our prediction, but because of the way in which the duration of married life is 
calculated (see the explanation above), the coefficient measuring how divorce law reforms 
affect the marital fertility rate of those married for 5 years 3-4 years after the introduction of the 
legal reform, could be partly capturing the behaviour of those married under the new regime. A 
similar pattern is observed in Columns (4) and (5). Therefore, our findings suggest that the 
selection effect matters in determining how divorce law reforms operate through marital 
fertility. 
When considering the fertility effect of divorce law reforms on marriages of 10 years or 
longer duration (see Columns (6), (7), and (8)), we observe that those reforms had a negative or 
non-significant effect on the marital fertility rate. As before, this can be explained by the 
selection effect, since in those cases almost all estimates capture the performance of those 
married under the old regime. The negative response is more clearly observed for those married 
under the old legal system and thus, since the average duration of marriage is about 9-10 years 
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), then wives married before divorce law reforms are more fearful 
of the break-up of their marriages, and under the new divorce regimes they are less likely to 
want a child. This decreases the marital fertility rate of these women.  
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VI. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyses the impact of the liberalization of divorce laws on fertility. Since divorce 
law reforms may reduce the value of marriage, and given that children are considered to be a 
marital-specific investment, it is expected that the implementation of these new regimes affects 
fertility decisions. To examine this issue, we use data from 18 European countries for the period 
1960 to 2006. Results suggest that divorce law reforms have a negative and permanent effect on 
fertility. The response of the fertility rate to divorce law reforms is quite robust to the 
introduction of a whole array of explanations that can also be responsible for the drop in the 
fertility rate since the late 1960s. These findings are also consistent to alternative specifications 
and controls for unobserved country-specific factors, time-variant factors at the country level, 
and different measures of fertility. 
We further explore the mechanisms that conduct the reaction of fertility to divorce law 
reforms by analysing the effect on out-of-wedlock fertility, as well as on marital fertility. We 
find that both decrease after the introduction of divorce law reforms, but the fall in marital 
fertility does not seem to be permanent, indicating that the negative response of the fertility rate 
to divorce law reforms is maintained over time by the decline in the non-marital fertility rate.  
We also study the impact of divorce law reforms on legitimate fertility by duration of 
marriage. The clear result of this analysis is that the fertility behaviour of couples who married 
under the new divorce law regimes differs from those married before the reforms. Thus, we 
suggest that the selection effect, which implies improvements in marriage match quality in 
response to divorce law reforms (Matouschek and Rasul 2008; Mechoulan 2006; Rasul 2006), 
plays an important role in fertility decisions. 
Our findings may have economic consequences for women. Although we do not 
account for the possible effect on the participation of women in the labour market of a decline in 
fertility, the literature suggests that the decrease in fertility may instigate the rise in female 
labour force participation (see Bloom et al. 2009; Mishra et al. 2010). This also has 
consequences for women’s education, since it can encourage women to invest in education due 
to the increase in the returns to women’s education that generate the increase in participation of 
the labour market. The decline in the fertility rate, jointly with the constant aging of European 
society, may also have negative consequences for the European welfare system, and specifically 
the pensions system, based on the maintenance of benefits to seniors by the taxes paid by the 
young. Then, although the number of women contributing to the system increases as they join 
the labour market in greater numbers, the decrease in the number of young people involves a 
problem of large dimension, endangering the entire system.  
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Table 1.- 1960 and 1970 Country-Level Predictors of Liberalization of Divorce Laws 
(Dependent Variable: Time Elapsed since Liberalization) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
A: Country-Level Characteristics from 1960 
 
TFR FLFP Education: GER 
% Infant 
Mortality 
Per Capita
GDP 
% Women 
in 
Parliament 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Divorce 
Rate 
Marriage 
Rate 
          
Point 
estimate -2.423 -0.068 -0.032 0.024 -0.054 -0.133 -0.127 -0.129 0.019 
S.e. (2.790) (0.212) (0.032) (0.052) (0.775) (0.287) (0.475) (2.170) (0.242) 
R-squared 0.047 0.006 0.022 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.0001 <0.0000 
B: Country-Level Characteristics from 1970 
 
TFR FLFP Education: GER 
% Infant 
Mortality 
Per Capita
GDP 
% Women 
in 
Parliament 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Divorce 
Rate 
Marriage 
Rate 
Point 
estimate 2.544 -0.124 -0.019 -0.014 0.140 -0.088 -0.707 -1.319 -0.444 
S.e. (3.555) (0.257) (0.024) (0.061) (0.647) (0.383) (0.517) (1.866) (0.759) 
R-squared 0.023 0.016 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.049 0.018 0.013 
Note: The dependent variable is the year in which divorce law reform was adopted in each country, minus 1970, the year when the 
first reform in the period analysed was introduced. Regressors are population-weighted state aggregates. The point estimates are 
obtained by regressing the dependent variable on each country characteristic individually. Results from regressions including all the 
variables in a given panel are not altered. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. There are 18 observations in each 
regression. 
 
Table 2.- Baseline Regression: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral -0.262***  -0.236***  -0.225***  
 (0.036)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.179***  -0.167***  -0.166*** 
  (0.045)  (0.034)  (0.032) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.266***  -0.255***  -0.242*** 
  (0.048)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.332***  -0.325***  -0.297*** 
  (0.051)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.407***  -0.406***  -0.356*** 
  (0.056)  (0.043)  (0.048) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.403***  -0.411***  -0.331*** 
  (0.059)  (0.047)  (0.054) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.409***  -0.438***  -0.329*** 
  (0.063)  (0.051)  (0.060) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.406***  -0.447***  -0.311*** 
  (0.066)  (0.054)  (0.065) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.359***  -0.444***  -0.225*** 
  (0.067)  (0.059)  (0.075) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.865 0.869 0.925 0.929 0.943 0.946 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. The countries considered in the analysis 
are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
**Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3.- Robustness Check: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.165*** -0.200*** -0.192*** -0.170*** -0.166*** -0.170*** -0.137*** -0.163*** -0.172*** -0.170***
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.289*** -0.251*** -0.249*** -0.242*** -0.250*** -0.214*** -0.253*** -0.248*** -0.256***
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.030) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.297*** -0.298*** -0.355*** -0.303*** -0.304*** -0.297*** -0.305*** -0.254*** -0.308*** -0.305*** -0.302***
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.358*** -0.416*** -0.359*** -0.369*** -0.356*** -0.371*** -0.331*** -0.372*** -0.378*** -0.385***
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.048) (0.045) (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.331*** -0.335*** -0.378*** -0.340*** -0.344*** -0.332*** -0.347*** -0.324*** -0.346*** -0.361*** -0.382***
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.050) (0.054) (0.051) (0.045) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.329*** -0.333*** -0.364*** -0.345*** -0.341*** -0.329*** -0.344*** -0.303*** -0.341*** -0.353*** -0.356***
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.056) (0.060) (0.057) (0.050) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.311*** -0.317*** -0.335*** -0.329*** -0.331*** -0.312*** -0.334*** -0.257*** -0.317*** -0.333*** -0.286***
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.062) (0.061) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.061) (0.065) (0.062) (0.055) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.225*** -0.238*** -0.218*** -0.270*** -0.254*** -0.226*** -0.260*** -0.208*** -0.224*** -0.260*** -0.223***
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.070) (0.070) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) (0.064) 
% Female Labour Force Participation  0.003         0.002 
  (0.004)         (0.004) 
Gross Enrolment Ratio: Female Education   0.009***        0.004*** 
   (0.001)        (0.001) 
% Infant Mortality    -0.046***       -0.039***
    (0.005)       (0.004) 
Per Capita GDP (thousands)     0.021  0.024*    -0.042***
     (0.013)  (0.014)    (0.013) 
% Women in Parliament      -0.0004 -0.002    -0.004* 
      (0.003) (0.003)    (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate as % Civilian Labour Force        -0.035***   -0.029***
        (0.003)   (0.003) 
Crude Divorce Rate         0.091***  0.149*** 
         (0.031)  (0.026) 
Crude Marriage Rate          0.092*** 0.071*** 
          (0.010) (0.009) 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.946 0.946 0.952 0.952 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.953 0.946 0.951 0.965 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical 
significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10% level. In all specifications are included: Year FE, Country FE, Country*Time and Country*Time2. 
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Table 3.- Robustness Check: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms Including Variables of Family Policies 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
            
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.171*** -0.128*** -0.177*** -0.166*** -0.164*** -0.234*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.036 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.241*** -0.247*** -0.198*** -0.251*** -0.238*** -0.239*** -0.336*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.109*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.296*** -0.292*** -0.299*** -0.257*** -0.303*** -0.293*** -0.291*** -0.410*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.172*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.350*** -0.359*** -0.321*** -0.361*** -0.350*** -0.348*** -0.495*** -0.264*** -0.265*** -0.249*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.330*** -0.320*** -0.335*** -0.294*** -0.343*** -0.318*** -0.318*** -0.483*** -0.269*** -0.273*** -0.258*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.328*** -0.315*** -0.334*** -0.290*** -0.345*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.491*** -0.299*** -0.302*** -0.288*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.310*** -0.295*** -0.317*** -0.266*** -0.325*** -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.478*** -0.314*** -0.319*** -0.295*** 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.056) (0.056) (0.052) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.223*** -0.206*** -0.232*** -0.180** -0.232*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.422*** -0.323*** -0.330*** -0.298*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059) 
Total Weeks of Maternity Leave  -0.008***         0.011*** 
  (0.003)         (0.002) 
Cash Benefits during Maternity Leave   -0.001        0.00003 
   (0.001)        (0.001) 
Total Weeks of Parental Leave    -0.001***       -0.001*** 
    (0.0003)       (0.0002) 
Cash Benefits during Parental Leave     0.003***      0.001*** 
     (0.001)      (0.0005) 
Total Weeks of Childcare Leave      0.002***     -0.0003 
      (0.001)     (0.001) 
Cash Benefits during Childcare Leave       0.005***    0.004*** 
       (0.002)    (0.001) 
Monthly Family Allowances (First Child)        0.003   0.001 
        (0.002)   (0.001) 
Monthly Family Allowances (Second Child)        -0.005*   -0.0004** 
        (0.003)   (0.002) 
Monthly Family Allowances (Third Child)        0.0003**   0.002** 
        (0.001)   (0.001) 
Value of Transfers to Family Type         0.0001  0.0001 
         (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
30 
 
Index of Direct and Indirect Cash Benefits          0.003 0.001 
          (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 799 799 799 799 799 799 799 759 587 587 587 
R-squared 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.948 0.947 0.946 0.946 0.953 0.961 0.961 0.968 
Notes: Each monetary value in this table is expressed in constant euros of 2005. Column (1) shows our baseline estimate. Column (12) includes a control for the total number of weeks of maternity 
leave. Column (13) includes a control for the cash benefits paid during maternity leave, as percentage of female wages in manufacture. Column (14) includes a control for the total number of weeks 
of parental leave. Column (15) includes a control for the cash benefits paid during parental leave, as percentage of female wages in manufacture. Column (16) includes a control for the total 
number of weeks of childcare leave. Column (17) includes a control for the cash benefits paid during childcare leave, as percentage of female wages in manufacture. Column (18) includes monthly 
family allowances for the first, second and third child (assuming a three-child family). Column (19) includes a control for the value of tax and benefit transfers of one-earner-two-parent two-child 
families (value calculated by subtracting the disposable income, after taxes and transfers, of a one-earner-two-parent-two-child family from that of a comparable childless single earner). Column 
(20) includes a control for the previous variable, but divided by the average gross earnings of a production worker. Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10% level. In all specifications are included: Year FE, Country FE, Country*Time and 
Country*Time2.  
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Table 4.- Robustness Check: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Controls:  FLFP 
Education:
GER 
% Infant 
Mortality 
Per Capita 
GDP 
% Women in
Parliament 
Unemployment
Rate 
Divorce 
Rate 
Marriage 
Rate 
          
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.145*** -0.219*** -0.180*** -0.121*** -0.149*** -0.119*** -0.108*** -0.157***
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.205*** -0.315*** -0.237*** -0.181*** -0.214*** -0.174*** -0.138*** -0.247***
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.297*** -0.244*** -0.385*** -0.284*** -0.218*** -0.256*** -0.213*** -0.203*** -0.312***
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.289*** -0.452*** -0.338*** -0.269*** -0.304*** -0.287*** -0.272*** -0.395***
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.331*** -0.255*** -0.423*** -0.315*** -0.229*** -0.272*** -0.288*** -0.248*** -0.381***
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.329*** -0.240*** -0.415*** -0.317*** -0.219*** -0.265*** -0.270*** -0.257*** -0.378***
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.311*** -0.221*** -0.392*** -0.300*** -0.200*** -0.240*** -0.198*** -0.216*** -0.364***
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.062) (0.060) (0.066) (0.066) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.225*** -0.164** -0.286*** -0.236*** -0.122 -0.161** -0.172** -0.139** -0.303***
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.071) (0.069) (0.076) (0.075) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
Control  -0.072*** 0.016*** -0.022*** 0.228*** -0.021*** 0.003 -0.609*** 0.381*** 
  (0.015) (0.002) (0.006) (0.030) (0.005) (0.008) (0.077) (0.057) 
Control Square/100   0.118*** -0.006*** -0.044*** -0.533*** 0.063*** -0.153*** 18.926*** -1.958***
  (0.023) (0.001) (0.008) (0.069) (0.013) (0.030) (1.921) (0.382) 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.946 0.948 0.953 0.954 0.950 0.948 0.955 0.953 0.953 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical 
significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10% level. In all specifications are included: Year FE, Country FE, 
Country*Time and Country*Time2.  
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Table 5.-Information on the Year of Introduction of Cohabitation andAbortion laws, and the Pill 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Country 
Cohabitation Laws 
Changes 
Abortion Laws 
 Changes (for cause) 
Abortion Laws 
 Changes (on demand) 
Pill  
Introduction 
Austria - - 1974 1962 
Belgium 1998 1990 - 1961 
Denmark  1970 1973 1966 
Finland  1970 - 1962 
France 1999 - 1975 1967 
Germany  1975 1995 1961 
Greece - 1978 1986 1980 
Iceland 1990 1975 - 1962 
Ireland - - - 1976 
Italy - - 1981 1968 
Luxembourg 2004 1978 - 1967 
The Netherlands 1998 - 1981 1962 
Norway  1964 1978 1966 
Portugal 1999 1984 - 1963 
Spain 1987 1985 - 1964 
Sweden 1987 - 1974 1964 
Switzerland - 1985 - 1961 
United Kingdom - 1967 - 1970 
Note: Column (1) shows the year of the introduction of cohabitation laws in each country during the period analysed 
(1960-2006). Column (2) shows the year of the introduction of abortion laws for cause in each country during the 
period analysed (1960-2006). Column (3) shows the year of the introduction of abortion-on-demand laws in each 
country during the period analysed (1960-2006). Column (4) shows the year of the introduction of the oral 
contraceptive pill in each country during the period analysed (1960-2006).  
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Table 6.- Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms after Adding Controls for Cohabitation Laws 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.155*** -0.164*** -0.144*** 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.032) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.234*** -0.249*** -0.211*** 
 (0.046) (0.036) (0.036) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.290*** -0.317*** -0.255*** 
 (0.049) (0.039) (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.354*** -0.392*** -0.307*** 
 (0.054) (0.044) (0.048) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.339*** -0.396*** -0.280*** 
 (0.058) (0.048) (0.054) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.335*** -0.419*** -0.271*** 
 (0.062) (0.052) (0.060) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.320*** -0.423*** -0.244*** 
 (0.065) (0.056) (0.065) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.244*** -0.408*** -0.167** 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.075) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.880 0.930 0.949 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006, (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 
10% level.  
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Table 7.- Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Completed Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral -0.177***  -0.126*  -0.156**  
 (0.053)  (0.072)  (0.072)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.130  -0.172*  -0.204** 
  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.082) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.142  -0.205**  -0.239*** 
  (0.088)  (0.097)  (0.092) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.183**  -0.288***  -0.324*** 
  (0.088)  (0.104)  (0.103) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.214**  -0.359***  -0.395*** 
  (0.088)  (0.111)  (0.115) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.198**  -0.383***  -0.417*** 
  (0.088)  (0.118)  (0.126) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.243***  -0.486***  -0.491*** 
  (0.075)  (0.129)  (0.142) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.210***  -0.524***  -0.513*** 
  (0.066)  (0.137)  (0.152) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.134**  -0.563***  -0.574*** 
  (0.059)  (0.145)  (0.160) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 434 434 434 434 434 434 
R-squared 0.842 0.844 0.879 0.884 0.932 0.934 
Note: Sample consists of cohorts of women who were born between 1940 and 1970 (balanced panel). The sample does not include 
data for Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Spain, due to the lack of data. For this reason, the sample is formed by the 
remaining fourteen countries. Data on the Completed Fertility Rate come from the Council of Europe (cohorts 1940 to 1944 and 
1961 to 1970) and the Eurostat and the UN Demographic Yearbooks (data on live births and total number of women born in each 
cohort, cohorts 1945 to 1960). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical 
significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
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Table 8.-Total Fertility Rate: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms and Abortion 
Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.179*** -0.138*** -0.167*** -0.123*** -0.166*** -0.160*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.266*** -0.236*** -0.255*** -0.219*** -0.242*** -0.265*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.332*** -0.285*** -0.325*** -0.281*** -0.297*** -0.334*** 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.407*** -0.344*** -0.406*** -0.315*** -0.356*** -0.377*** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.403*** -0.370*** -0.411*** -0.335*** -0.331*** -0.394*** 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.047) (0.049) (0.054) (0.054) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.409*** -0.441*** -0.438*** -0.404*** -0.329*** -0.474*** 
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.051) (0.053) (0.060) (0.060) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.406*** -0.476*** -0.447*** -0.425*** -0.311*** -0.504*** 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.054) (0.057) (0.065) (0.065) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.359*** -0.471*** -0.444*** -0.429*** -0.225*** -0.438*** 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.059) (0.063) (0.075) (0.072) 
Abortion on Demand 1-2  -0.030  -0.196***  -0.167*** 
  (0.049)  (0.038)  (0.035) 
Abortion on Demand 3-4  0.011  -0.177***  -0.130*** 
  (0.049)  (0.039)  (0.037) 
Abortion on Demand 5-6  0.034  -0.185***  -0.104** 
  (0.049)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
Abortion on Demand 7-8  0.059  -0.195***  -0.093** 
  (0.050)  (0.041)  (0.044) 
Abortion on Demand 9-10  0.056  -0.236***  -0.118** 
  (0.050)  (0.043)  (0.048) 
Abortion on Demand 11-12  0.061  -0.260***  -0.109** 
  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.052) 
Abortion on Demand 13-14  0.071  -0.237***  -0.033 
  (0.062)  (0.053)  (0.058) 
Abortion on Demand >15  0.220***  -0.275***  0.031 
  (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.066) 
Abortion for Cause 1-2  -0.257***  -0.294***  -0.179*** 
  (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.035) 
Abortion for Cause  3-4  -0.224***  -0.275***  -0.103*** 
  (0.052)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
Abortion for Cause  5-6  -0.165***  -0.240***  -0.002 
  (0.054)  (0.042)  (0.044) 
Abortion for Cause  7-8  -0.127**  -0.223***  0.068 
  (0.054)  (0.044)  (0.049) 
Abortion for Cause  9-10  -0.160***  -0.266***  0.074 
  (0.056)  (0.046)  (0.055) 
Abortion for Cause  11-12  -0.174***  -0.315***  0.069 
  (0.057)  (0.049)  (0.061) 
Abortion for Cause  13-14  -0.079  -0.232***  0.199*** 
  (0.058)  (0.051)  (0.066) 
Abortion for Cause  >15  0.037  -0.188***  0.357*** 
  (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.076) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.869 0.885 0.929 0.941 0.943 0.958 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Adding the dynamic effect of abortion laws on demand and for cause. 
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Table 9.-Total Fertility Rate: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms and Oral 
Contraception 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.179*** -0.210*** -0.167*** -0.193*** -0.166*** -0.204*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.266*** -0.318*** -0.255*** -0.302*** -0.242*** -0.305*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.332*** -0.399*** -0.325*** -0.388*** -0.297*** -0.377*** 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.407*** -0.481*** -0.406*** -0.477*** -0.356*** -0.447*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.048) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.403*** -0.475*** -0.411*** -0.485*** -0.331*** -0.424*** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.054) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.409*** -0.475*** -0.438*** -0.508*** -0.329*** -0.414*** 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.051) (0.051) (0.060) (0.060) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.406*** -0.459*** -0.447*** -0.508*** -0.311*** -0.386*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.054) (0.054) (0.065) (0.065) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.359*** -0.402*** -0.444*** -0.502*** -0.225*** -0.289*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.059) (0.059) (0.075) (0.073) 
The Pill Allowed 1-2  -0.069  -0.016  0.009 
  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.035) 
The Pill Allowed 3-4  -0.049  0.017  0.044 
  (0.048)  (0.042)  (0.039) 
The Pill Allowed 5-6  -0.039  0.043  0.068 
  (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.044) 
The Pill Allowed 7-8  -0.056  0.043  0.068 
  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.050) 
The Pill Allowed 9-10  -0.134**  -0.019  0.003 
  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.055) 
The Pill Allowed 11-12  -0.211***  -0.083  -0.065 
  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.060) 
The Pill Allowed 13-14  -0.309***  -0.167**  -0.156** 
  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.065) 
The Pill Allowed >15  -0.371***  -0.214***  -0.206*** 
  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.073) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.869 0.876 0.929 0.934 0.943 0.950 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Adding the dynamic effect of the pill. 
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Table 10.-Total Fertility Rate: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms With All 
Controls 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.179*** -0.066** -0.167*** -0.117*** -0.166*** -0.081*** 
 (0.045) (0.031) (0.034) (0.024) (0.032) (0.024) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.266*** -0.070** -0.255*** -0.144*** -0.242*** -0.102*** 
 (0.048) (0.035) (0.036) (0.027) (0.036) (0.030) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.332*** -0.122*** -0.325*** -0.185*** -0.297*** -0.135*** 
 (0.051) (0.037) (0.039) (0.029) (0.041) (0.034) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.407*** -0.174*** -0.406*** -0.236*** -0.356*** -0.183*** 
 (0.056) (0.041) (0.043) (0.033) (0.048) (0.039) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.403*** -0.168*** -0.411*** -0.229*** -0.331*** -0.176*** 
 (0.059) (0.044) (0.047) (0.037) (0.054) (0.044) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.409*** -0.179*** -0.438*** -0.241*** -0.329*** -0.186*** 
 (0.063) (0.047) (0.051) (0.041) (0.060) (0.049) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.406*** -0.125** -0.447*** -0.199*** -0.311*** -0.135** 
 (0.066) (0.050) (0.054) (0.045) (0.065) (0.055) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.359*** -0.112** -0.444*** -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.102* 
 (0.067) (0.052) (0.059) (0.051) (0.075) (0.061) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.869 0.955 0.929 0.975 0.943 0.980 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. Adding all controls. 
 
Table 11.-Marital Birth Rate: How Does Divorce Law Reforms Operate Through Marital Status?  
(Dependent Variable: Marital Birth Rate (Marital Births/500 Inhabitants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral -0.503***  -0.388***  -0.422***  
 (0.100)  (0.083)  (0.088)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.291**  -0.203**  -0.235** 
  (0.123)  (0.102)  (0.103) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.507***  -0.396***  -0.436*** 
  (0.131)  (0.109)  (0.116) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.620***  -0.486***  -0.535*** 
  (0.141)  (0.118)  (0.132) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.746***  -0.579***  -0.632*** 
  (0.153)  (0.129)  (0.152) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.620***  -0.430***  -0.479*** 
  (0.163)  (0.140)  (0.172) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.553***  -0.361**  -0.421** 
  (0.173)  (0.152)  (0.191) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.476***  -0.277*  -0.340 
  (0.182)  (0.162)  (0.209) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.257  -0.095  -0.150 
  (0.185)  (0.177)  (0.238) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.924 0.926 0.951 0.952 0.958 0.959 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
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Table 12.-Non-Marital Birth Rate: How Does Divorce Law Reforms Operate Through Marital 
Status? 
(Dependent Variable: Non-Marital Birth Rate (Out of wedlock births/500 Inhabitants)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral -0.157**  -0.036  -0.048*  
 (0.061)  (0.029)  (0.025)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.108  -0.012  -0.079*** 
  (0.076)  (0.035)  (0.028) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.152*  -0.040  -0.138*** 
  (0.081)  (0.037)  (0.032) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.199**  -0.072*  -0.204*** 
  (0.087)  (0.040)  (0.036) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.273***  -0.140***  -0.308*** 
  (0.095)  (0.044)  (0.042) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.331***  -0.204***  -0.408*** 
  (0.101)  (0.048)  (0.047) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.398***  -0.264***  -0.495*** 
  (0.107)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.424***  -0.291***  -0.549*** 
  (0.113)  (0.055)  (0.057) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.352***  -0.242***  -0.545*** 
  (0.115)  (0.060)  (0.065) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.813 0.816 0.962 0.964 0.977 0.980 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 13.-Ilegitimacy Rate: Non-Marital Birth over Total Births: How Does Divorce Law Reforms 
Operate Through Marital Status? 
(Dependent Variable: Out of Wedlock Births/10 Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral -0.182**  -0.033  -0.052  
 (0.089)  (0.043)  (0.036)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.140  -0.020  -0.104** 
  (0.111)  (0.053)  (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.171  -0.036  -0.161*** 
  (0.118)  (0.057)  (0.047) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.208  -0.061  -0.230*** 
  (0.126)  (0.061)  (0.053) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.264*  -0.119*  -0.339*** 
  (0.137)  (0.067)  (0.061) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.324**  -0.201***  -0.471*** 
  (0.146)  (0.073)  (0.069) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.389**  -0.272***  -0.584*** 
  (0.155)  (0.079)  (0.077) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.410**  -0.306***  -0.656*** 
  (0.163)  (0.084)  (0.084) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.300*  -0.254***  -0.672*** 
  (0.166)  (0.092)  (0.096) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.859 0.859 0.969 0.969 0.983 0.984 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
39 
 
Table 14.-Marital Fertility (Varying by Duration of Marriage): Static and Dynamic Effects of 
Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent variable: Marital Births / Total Marital Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 0.003 0.006*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0003) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.010 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.0004 -0.002*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.001*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.023*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.003** -0.000 -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.001*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.032*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.007*** -0.001*** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0004) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.038*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.002* -0.0004 -0.007*** -0.001*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0005) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.039*** 0.007** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.002 -0.006*** -0.001** 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.040*** 0.007** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.004 -0.005*** -0.001** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.035** 0.003 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.006 -0.004** -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country*time YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country*time2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 
R-squared 0.887 0.905 0.905 0.861 0.874 0.892 0.949 0.970 
Note: Sample: 1960–1998 (balanced panel). In column (1) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been married 
less than 1 year. In column (2) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been 3 years married. In column (3) the 
variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been 5 years married. In column (4) the variable "marital births" includes 
live births of couples who have been 7 years married. In column (5) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have 
been 9 years married. In column (6) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been between 10 and 14 years 
married. In column (7) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been between 15 and 19 years married. In 
column (8) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been married 20 years or more. Estimated using country 
population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical 
significance at 10% level.  
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 Figure 1:
TFR, Marital Births, and Out-of-Wedlock Births
Europe 1960-2006
 
Notes: The countries considered in the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
R
at
e
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
Year
TFR of Portugal
Average TFR of those countries without a divorce law reform until 1981
Notes
Source: Eurostat
Portugal implemented a divorce law reform in 1976
Figure 2:
Total Fertility Rate: Portugal
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 Figure 3:
Total Fertility Rate: The Netherlands
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Figure 4:
Birth Rates, Europe 1960-2006
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Figure 6: 
 
Notes: Estimated using country-specific quadratic trends. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure 7: 
 
Notes: Estimated using country-specific quadratic trends. All coefficients but two (β>15 and β1-2 when the dependent 
variable is TFR of women aged 20-24 and 30-34, respectively) are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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APPENDIX  Data sources and Definition of Variables  
Variable Definition Source 
Figure Variables   
Crude Birth Rate Annual number of births per 100 inhabitants Eurostat 
Abortion Rate  Annual number of abortions per one thousand inhabitants Eurostat 
Marriage Rate Annual number of marriages per one thousand inhabitants Eurostat 
Divorce Rate Annual number of divorces per one thousand inhabitants Eurostat 
Birth Rate Annual number of births per one hundred women Computed by authors using data 
from the Eurostat 
Dependent Variable   
Total Fertility Rate The mean number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime 
if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by 
age of a given year. 
Eurostat and UN Demographic 
Yearbook 
Marital Birth Rate Annual number of births within marriage per five hundred inhabitants Computed by authors using data 
from the Eurostat 
Non-Marital Birth Rate Annual number of out of wedlock births per five hundred inhabitants Computed by authors using data 
from the Eurostat 
Ilegitimacy Ratio Annual number of out of wedlock births per ten births Computed by authors using data 
from the Eurostat 
Completed Fertility Rate The average number of children born to a cohort of women up to the end of their 
childbearing age, from the cohort´s beginning of exposure to risk (at age 15) until the 
age when all members of the cohort have reached the end of the reproductive period (at 
age 49) 
Council of Europe (1940 to 1944 
and 1961 to 1970), and computed by 
authors using data from the Eurostat 
and from the UN Demographic 
Yearbooks (several issues)(1945 to 
1960) 
Control Variables   
Female Labour Force Participation Female Civilian Labour Force over number of women, in percentage Computed by authors using data 
from the OECD and Eurostat 
Gross Enrolment Ratio Total female enrolment in education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in given 
school-year 
Unesco 
Infant Mortality The ratio of the number of deaths of children under one year of age during the year to 
the number of live births in that year. The value is expressed per 1,000 live births. 
Eurostat 
Per Capita GDP Gross Domestic Product divided by the population of each country, expressed in 
thousands  
Computed by authors using data 
from the United Nations 
Women in Parliament Percentage of women in each national parliament on the total of seats of the parliament Computed by authors using data 
from the Inter Parliamentary Union 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate as percentage of the civilian labour force OECD 
Crude Divorce Rate The ratio of the number of divorces during the year to the average population in that 
year. The value is expressed per 1000 inhabitants. 
Eurostat 
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Crude Marriage Rate The ratio of the number of marriages during the year to the average population in that 
year. The value is expressed per 1000 inhabitants 
Eurostat 
Monthly Family Allowances (First, Second and Third Child) Monthly family allowances for the first, second and third child (assuming a three-child 
family), in constant euros of 2005. It is expressed in hundreds of euros. 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Total Weeks of Maternity leave Total number of weeks of maternity leave Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Cash Benefits During Maternity Leave Cash benefits paid during maternity leave (as a percent of female wages in 
manufacturing) 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Total Weeks of Parental Leave Total number of weeks of parental leave Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Cash Benefits During Parental Leave Cash benefits paid during parental leave (as a percent of female wages in 
manufacturing) 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Total Weeks of Childcare Leave Total number of weeks of childcare leave Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Cash Benefits During Childcare Leave Cash benefits paid during childcare leave (as a percent of female wages in 
manufacturing) 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Value of Transfers to Family Type Value of tax and benefit transfers of one-earner-two-parent two-child families. The 
value was calculated by subtracting the  disposable income (after taxes and transfers) of 
a one-earner-two-parent-two-child family from that of a comparable childless single 
earner, in constant euros of 2005 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
Index of Direct and Indirect Cash Benefits This indicator represents the difference between the disposable income of a two-child 
one-earner family and that of a single earner and is expressed as a percentage of the 
average earnings of a production worker, in constant euros of 2005 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier 
 
 
 
